Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 25

Number 1

Article 3

1997

Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to Questions
of Religious Practice and Belief
Samuel J. Levine
St. John's University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Digital
Part of the Religion Law Commons
Commons
Network

Recommended Citation

Logo
Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice
and Belief, 25 Fordham Urb. L.J. 85 (1997).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol25/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious
Practice and Belief
Cover Page Footnote
Assistant Legal Writing Professor and Lecturer in Jewish Law, St. John's University School of Law; LL.M.
1996, Columbia University; Ordination 1996, Yeshiva University; J.D. 1994 Fordham University; B.A. 1990,
Yeshiva University. An earlier draft of this article was written for Kent Greenawalt's Seminar on Church and
State at Columbia University School of Law. I thank Professor Greenawalt for the opportunity to present
my paper at the seminar, and I thank him as well as the seminar participants for their helpful comments
and encouragement. I also received comments and encouragement from Mark Tushnet, Irene Merker
Rosenberg, Vincent Blasi, Teresa Collett, and Victor Barall.

This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol25/iss1/3

RETHINKING THE SUPREME COURT'S

HANDS-OFF APPROACH TO QUESTIONS OF
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND BELIEF
Samuel J. Levine*
Table of Contents
Introduction ...................................................
I. The Basic Principles ...................................
A. Church Property Disputes .........................
B. Church Tribunal Decisions-SerbianEastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich .................
II. Free Exercise Cases ...................................
A. Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment
Sec. D iv............................................
B. United States v. Lee ...............................
C. Goldman v. Weinberger ...........................
D . Bowen v. Roy .....................................
E. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ...............
F. Employment Division v. Smith ....................
G. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act ..........
III. Establishment Clause Cases ...........................
A. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union ..............................................
B. Lee v. Weisman ....................................
C onclusion ....................................................

85
88
88
90
92
92
101
104
106
111
115
122
123
124
130
133

Introduction
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has shown an
increasing unwillingness to engage in deciding matters that relate
to the interpretation of religious practice and belief. Justices have
provided various rationales for the Court's approach. Some Jus* Assistant Legal Writing Professor and Lecturer in Jewish Law, St. John's Uni-
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tices have suggested practical justifications for their reluctance to
examine closely religious beliefs, declaring that courts are "ill
equipped" to deal with such questions,' which these Justices consider beyond judicial competence. 2 Other Justices have cited constitutional considerations to support their view that courts should
refrain from deciding questions of religious interpretation.3
While these Justices have articulated valid concerns, courts
should not allow these concerns to deter them from making decisions vital to the effective adjudication of Free Exercise and Establishment Clause (collectively, "Religion Clauses") cases. Courts do
not consider it beyond their competence to decide complex scientific questions when such decisions are necessary to adjudicate a
case. Similarly, courts should decide questions of religious interpretation when the failure to do so would prevent a meaningful
resolution of a case. Nor should the constitutional concerns, suggested vaguely by some Justices, deter the courts from making decisions that are truly necessary to protect the more concrete
principles of the Religion Clauses.
In fact, it appears that as a result of the Court's increasing refusal
to consider carefully the religious questions central to many cases,
the Court often tends to group together religious claims and practices, regardless of the relative validity or importance of a particular practice within a religious system. This approach may lead to a
number of disturbing results, some of which have already evidenced themselves in Supreme Court decisions in both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause cases.
In Free Exercise Clause cases, grouping together all religious
claims may require courts to accept and protect to the same degree
all claims which appear to have a basis in religious belief. Courts
may thus lose the ability to reject claims of relatively minor or even
questionable religious significance. In such cases, courts may grant
unnecessary and improper protections and exemptions to professed adherents, resulting in potential burdens on the government
and society as a whole that could otherwise be avoided.
1. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 678 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Thomas v. Review Bd.
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616-17 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring);
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439, 457-58 (1987); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.

3. See, e.g, United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457-58.
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Conversely, grouping together religious claims in Free Exercise
Clause cases may lead courts to the opposite extreme of adopting
an approach that allows sharp limitations on all religious claims,
regardless of the more substantial nature of some claims. It is arguable that this latter danger is manifested in the reasoning expressed by many Justices in the decisions leading up to and
including Employment Division v. Smith,4 the landmark decision
that greatly restricted religious liberties, and which prompted Congress to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Paralleling the dangers in Free Exercise Clause cases, there are
two kinds of dangers that may result from courts' grouping together religious practices in cases involving the Establishment
Clause. If courts are willing to attribute the same religious character to any practice related to religion, ignoring the different levels
of religious meaning and motivation within different practices,
courts may adopt one of two similarly opposing positions. One
possibility is that courts will engage in an undesirably broad application of the Establishment Clause, finding that the government
may not support any practice with even a remote connection to
religion, and thus preventing even proper governmental accommodation of largely secular expression. If, instead, courts take a more
narrow view of the Establishment Clause, then grouping together
many practices despite differing levels of religious character may
lead courts thereby to allow the government to engage in the impermissible establishment of practices with a substantial religious
component.
Finally, the various dangers in both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence may be exacerbated by the fact that the
Supreme Court has continuously broadened the range of the kinds
of religious questions it refuses to consider. If courts continue to
evade deciding these religious questions, their approach will perpetuate the unfortunate results that are already evident in a
number of Supreme Court decisions.
Part I of this Article discusses some early cases, prior to 1981, in
which the Supreme Court first expressed its hands-off approach to
deciding questions of religious practice and belief. This Part suggests that in these decisions, as a result of a proper concern for
religious autonomy, the Court already began the process of expanding the principle of judicial non-interference, at the cost of
sacrificing effective adjudication of important constitutional issues.
4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Part II critiques the Court's approach in Free Exercise Clause
cases, identifying different problems that have arisen as a result of
the Court's approach. Tracing the development of the Court's Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence, this Part argues that the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith was, in part, a result of the
Court's increasing reluctance to decide questions involving religious interpretation.
Part III identifies problems that may arise out of the Court's approach in Establishment Clause cases. Though these problems
may not always be readily apparent, a close look at the opinions of
certain Justices suggests the emergence of problems parallel to
those in Free Exercise Clause cases. Finally, this Article concludes
with the hope that the Court will acknowledge the need to reconsider its approach and adopt a new willingness to examine more
closely questions relating to religious practice and belief.'
I.

The Basic Principles

It is troubling that an approach which prevents courts from
closely examining religious principles and practices can often result
in less than desirable outcomes. On the other hand, it is sensible
that courts should not serve as a theology board and should try to
refrain from judicially imposed religious interpretation. Indeed,
based on this logic, in recent years the Supreme Court has increasingly avoided addressing issues that require consideration of the
nature of religious practice and belief. Nevertheless, in light of
some of the results and trends, both unfortunate and potentially
dangerous, that have emerged from Supreme Court decisions, it
may be time for the Court to reexamine its past decisions and reconsider its future treatment of cases involving religious questions.
A.

Church Property Disputes

An early and important expression of the Court's unwillingness,
on constitutional grounds, to engage in interpretation of religious
beliefs is found in cases involving church property disputes, such as
the 1965 case, Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
5. In another context, I suggested that the Supreme Court's inability or unwillingness to look closely at religious practice and belief, from the perspective of religious adherents, prevented the Court from producing law that incorporates an
understanding of minority religions. See Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious Minority Perspective, 5
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 153 (1996).

1997]

RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND BELIEF

Memorial Presbyterian Church.6 In Presbyterian Church, the Court
considered the question of "whether the restraints of the First
Amendment... permit a civil court to award church property on
the basis of the interpretation and significance the civil court assigns to aspects of church doctrine."' 7 The Court concluded that
"[t]o reach those questions would require the civil courts to engage
in the forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church doctrine." 8 Yet, a careful look at the facts of the case may suggest that
the Court's holding in PresbyterianChurch has limited relevance to
other cases.
The dispute in Presbyterian Church arose when two local
churches withdrew from a general church organization, believing
that the general church had violated that organization's constitution and had departed from church doctrine.9 The general church
established an Administrative Commission that took control of the
local churches' property on behalf of the general church, and the
local churches filed suit. The Georgia State Courts held that, under
Georgia law, the general church's control over the property depended on its adherence to its doctrine as it existed at the time of
the local churches' affiliation. 10
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the Georgia court's "departure-from-doctrine" approach violated the First
Amendment by requiring civil courts to determine "the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those
doctrines to the religion."' 1 The Court's decision emphasized that
the departure-from-doctrine standard was created by state law, not
by church law. 12 The Court noted that the law, therefore, would
improperly require the state, instead of the church, to interpret
church doctrine, and that any church decision on the matter would
be "at most... tangential" to the "state-fashioned departure-fromdoctrine standard."' 3 Moreover, the Court stated, even if the
church had applied the state standard, a court's review and enforcement of the church decision would likewise violate the First
4
Amendment.'
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

393 U.S. 440 (1969).
Id. at 441.
Id. at 451.
See id. at 442.
See id. at 443-44.
Id. at 450.
See id. at 451.
Id.
See id.
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It is notable that the Court expressly acknowledged that it would
be permissible for a court to "engag[e] in the narrowest kind of
review of a specific church decision-i.e., whether the decision resulted from fraud, collusion or arbitrariness."' 5 Though the Court
did not define or discuss these categories of permissible review, it
would seem that to identify fraudulent religious decisions by the
church, a court would be required to engage in some analysis of the
religious issues underlying the church decisions. Similarly, such an
analysis would appear necessary in a court's evaluation of the possibly fraudulent nature of an individual's religious claim.
Church Tribunal Decisions-Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich
The question of how to interpret the Court's decision in Presbyterian Church arose in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich. 16 In Milivojevich, a Bishop was defrocked by the
Church hierarchy. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
Bishop's removal and defrockment should be set aside as "arbitrary," finding that the Church's conduct did not conform with the
Church's constitution.1 7 The majority of the United States
Supreme Court, relying on a number of cases including Presbyterian Church, held that the Illinois court, in rejecting the decisions
of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals, "impermissibly substitute[d]
its own inquiry into church polity and resolutions based thereon of
those disputes."18
Ironically, the three Justices who issued concurring and dissenting opinions in Milivojevich were Justices White, Stevens and thenJustice Rehnquist, three Justices who would later call for broad
limitations on court involvement in interpreting religious questions.' 9 In a short concurring opinion, Justice White observed that
the majority's opinion was predicated on an understanding of the
Serbian Orthodox Church as a hierarchical church and the American-Canadian Diocese, which was involved in the case, as part of
that Church. Justice White stated that, in his view, "[t]hese basic
issues are for the courts' ultimate decision, and the fact that church
B.

15. Id. The Court cited approvingly the approach in Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280
U.S. 1 (1929), the facts of which, it stated, allowed "civil courts [to] adjudicate the
rights . . .simply by engaging in the narrowest kind of review .... " Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. at 451.

16. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
17. 328 N.E.2d 268 (I11.
18. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708.
19. See discussion infra Parts II.B-C.
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authorities may render their opinions on them does not foreclose
the courts from coming to their independent judgment."20 Thus,
according to Justice White, if church tribunals render a judgment,
based on religious interpretation and regarding church structure,
courts still have the duty and authority to make an independent
judgment, which may require a religious interpretation different
from that of the church tribunals. The majority's approach likely
would preclude such an inquiry into church polity, through which a
court potentially could resolve disputes in a manner that differs
from the interpretation of the church.
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Stevens,
identified a more fundamental problem in the majority's approach.
Justice Rehnquist quoted the majority view that "'a civil court
must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it
finds them."' 21 As Justice Rehnquist noted, however, this principle
does not free the courts from analyzing religious questions,
because:
even this rule requires that proof be made as to what these decisions are, and if proofs on that issue conflict the civil court will
inevitably have to choose one over the other. In so choosing, if
the choice be a rational one, reasons must be adduced as to why
one proffered decision is to prevail over another. Such reasons
will obviously be based on the canon law by which the disputants have agreed to bind themselves, but they must also represent a preference for one view of that law over another.22
As Justice Rehnquist explained, the Illinois courts made such a
rational decision, "on the basis of testimony from experts on the
canon law at issue, that the decision of the religious tribunal involved was rendered in violation of its own stated rules of procedure. ' 23 Thus, Justice Rehnquist presented a reasonable method
for courts to fulfill the obligation of adjudicating disputes regarding
religious doctrine, through rational reasoning based on expert testimony. This method is, in fact, similar to the way courts adjudicate
disputes involving equally technical scientific issues.
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist limited the applicability of the
cases cited by the majority, including Presbyterian Church, noting
that "[t]he rule in those cases, one which seems fairly implicit in the
history of our First Amendment, is that the government may not
20.
21.
22.
23.

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 725 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713).
Id. at 726-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 727 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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displace the free religious choices of its citizens by placing its
weight behind a particular religious belief, tenet, or sect."' 24 Addressing Presbyterian Church in particular, Justice Rehnquist
stressed that the Court's decision was in the context of the state's
application of a state-created rule based upon "departure from
25
doctrine.
Finally, apart from Justice Rehnquist's argument, the very logic
of the majority's decision in Milivojevich could have limited the
application of the Court's hands-off approach to the context in
which it was decided. The majority opinion expressly predicated
the Court's decision on the proposition that courts should not substitute their interpretation for that of a religious tribunal. In addition to its constitutional basis, the Court's view rests on the sound
policy consideration of respect for the autonomy of religious institutions as well as a recognition that a church tribunal likely will be
a more qualified interpreter of church doctrine than a secular
court. However, in a case of a genuine dispute between parties
regarding church doctrine, particularly when no religious tribunal
has rendered an opinion, the majority's rationale would not apply.
In such a case, then, it would seem both proper and necessary for a
court to adjudicate the matter.
II. Free Exercise Cases
Thomas v. Review Bd Ind Employment Sec. Div.
Five years after Milivojevich, the Supreme Court was indeed
faced with a dispute between parties regarding religious interpretation, in the absence of a decision by a religious tribunal. In
Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,26 a Jehovah's
Witness terminated his employment after being transferred from a
roll foundry to a department that produced turrets for military
tanks.27 Pursuant to what he claimed to be religious principles
against working on the production of weapons, Thomas quit his
job.28 Despite finding that Thomas's religious beliefs precluded his
work at the department, an administrative referee and the Review
Board both concluded that under Indiana statute he was not entitled to unemployment compensation. 29 The Indiana Court of ApA.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 733 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id.
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
See id. at 710.

28. See id. at 709.
29. See id. at 711-12.

19971

RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND BELIEF

peals reversed, holding that the denial of benefits was an
unconstitutional violation of Thomas's free exercise rights.3" The
Indiana Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding, in part, that Thomas's decision to quit was based on
31
a "personal philosophical choice" rather than on religious belief.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted
that the Indiana court considered it significant that another member of the Jehovah's Witnesses did not object on religious grounds
to working on tank turrets.32 The Court rejected the Indiana
court's approach, stating, without citation to precedent, that "it is
not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire
whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of his faith. '33 Therefore, based on the prin'34
ciple that "[c]ourts are not arbiters of religious interpretation,
the Court refused to engage in an analysis of whether Thomas had
presented a viable view of the beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses. Instead, without explanation, the Court apparently chose to accept
Thomas's interpretation, stating only that "[o]n this record, it is
clear that Thomas terminated his employment for religious reasons." 35 Having thus concluded that Indiana's unemployment benefits scheme conflicted with Thomas's religious practice, the Court
applied the stringent compelling interest standard to the government program and held that the state program violated Thomas's
free exercise rights.36
The Court's approach in Thomas represented an expanded level
of judicial non-interference toward religious interpretation, beyond
the deferential approach of the majority in Milivojevich. In
Milivojevich, the Court merely held that courts should not contradict the religious interpretations of religious tribunals. In Thomas,
however, the Court held that even when no religious tribunal has
ruled on a matter, it is still outside the judicial function to make a
decision on religious interpretation. 37 Justice Rehnquist's dissent30. See id. at 712.
31. See id. at 712-13.
32. See id. at 715.
33. Id. at 716.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 718-19.
37. Additionally, although the opinion focused on the role of the courts in adjudicating questions of religious interpretation, the Court in Thomas seemed to reject the
very notion of recognizing, in consideration of a Free Exercise Clause claim, a somewhat standard view within a specific religious system. While the Court may have understandably found it more difficult to identify viable views in the absence of a ruling
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ing opinion in Milivojevich, therefore, appears even more responsive to the majority's approach in Thomas. Justice Rehnquist's
reasoned analysis in his Milivojevich dissent allows and requires
courts to decide questions of religious interpretation when necessary in order to adjudicate a case. Unlike the majority in Thomas,
which considered courts "ill equipped"38 to resolve such matters,
Justice Rehnquist recognized that courts can decide these questions by engaging in standard judicial conduct of relying on expert
testimony and making a rational determination on that basis.
Moreover, given the facts of Thomas, the Court's preference for
non-interference raises additional questions. While it may generally be desirable for courts to avoid deciding between different perceptions of a particular faith, the Court's overriding concern for
such judicial non-interference may have prevented it from addressing fully the central issue in the case. The Court failed to explain
the basis for its conclusion that Thomas's claim was entitled to the
powerful protections of the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, dissenting in Thomas, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the Court failed
even to make clear whether it accepted or rejected the Indiana
Supreme Court's finding that Thomas's decision was a personal
philosophical choice.39 Although Justice Rehnquist may have
overstated his argument-as the Court did find Thomas's decision
a religious one-his comment points to the vague and incomplete
nature of the Court's analysis.
The Court's failure to provide a complete analysis is, significant
because, as the Court acknowledged, "[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause... ."40 This principle was the basis for the Indiana court's requiring a showing that
Thomas's claim was based on his religion. 41 Additionally, because
Thomas's professed religion was that of the Jehovah's Witnesses, it
is reasonable to require that his religious claim be based on the
religious principles of the Jehovah's Witnesses. Thus, the Indiana
court, quite sensibly, considered the view of another member of
the Jehovah's Witnesses in trying to determine whether Thomas's
claim was grounded in a viable interpretation of his own professed
by a religious tribunal, the analysis in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), may
suggest that courts have the ability, and therefore the duty, to rule on the viability of
individual views. See infra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
38. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16.
39. See id. at 723 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 713.
41. See Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1131
(Ind. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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religion. Certainly, the views of another adherent were not dispositive; nevertheless, the fact that Thomas's interpretation was disputed by another Jehovah's Witness at least suggested the need for
further investigation by a court. Without such investigation, the
Supreme Court was unable to demonstrate how it determined that
Thomas's claim was truly religious in nature, rather than merely
personal and philosophical.
The 1972 landmark case, Wisconsin v. Yoder,42 in which the
Court decided the issue of whether the Amish way of life constituted a religion, is perhaps instructive. In Yoder, the Court expressed the principle, cited in Thomas, that "to have the protection
of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief."43 The Court distinguished such claims from those which are
"personal and philosophical," and therefore "do not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses." 44 In explaining that the Amish
way of life was indeed religious in nature, the Court provided extensive citations from the uncontested testimony of expert witnesses in the fields of religion and education.45 The Court
concluded that "we see that the record in this case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not
merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious
conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to
daily living. "46
The Court did note in Yoder that "a determination of what is a
'religious' belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection
may present a most delicate question."47 Nevertheless, the Court
recognized that even this delicate question must be answered, because "the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every
person to make his own standards on matters of conduct on which
society as a whole has important interests. ' 48 While the Court did
not delineate a precise method for determining what beliefs qualify
as religious in nature, its determination that the Amish belief was a
religious one was based on expert testimony, as well as on the fact
that the belief was shared by an organized group and was closely
related to a daily lifestyle.49
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 215.
Id. at 216.
See id. at 209-12.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 215-16.
See id. at 216-19.
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In Thomas, however, the Court accepted the viability of
Thomas's interpretation of the religion of the Jehovah's Witnesses
based on his claim alone, without any further showing. 50 Unlike
the Court's careful analysis in Yoder, the Court in Thomas did not
present any expert testimony to indicate that Thomas's belief was
religious in nature or shared in any way by an organized group. 1
To the contrary, the fact that Thomas's co-religionist disagreed
with his interpretation of their religion at least raised the possibility
that Thomas's beliefs were not generally shared by Jehovah's Witnesses. 52 In light of the Court's approach in Yoder, it is surprising
that the court so willingly concluded that Thomas maintained a
valid religious claim.
Even under Yoder, there is no reason to assume that, to succeed,
a religious claim must represent the dominant view of a particular
religion or denomination. Nevertheless, it seems that Yoder would
require that in order to be considered religious in nature, a claim
must at least represent more than the radically variant view of a
single individual.53 Therefore, a finding that Thomas's claim was
valid arguably depended on a showing that his perception of his
religion was at least a viable one, even if disputed by many or even
50. See Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
51. See id. at 715-16.
52. See id.
53. As the Tennessee Supreme Court observed, when faced with a claim that it
considered to be of questionably religious nature,
most of the free exercise cases decided by the United States Supreme Court
have involved the religious beliefs and practices of well established religions,
well documented beliefs and practices long adhered to, so that the Court has
not been called upon to explicitly articulate what constitutes a religious belief that is entitled to First Amendment protection.
Tennessee v. Hodges, 695 S.W.2d 171, 173 (1985).
Nevertheless, in considering the allegedly religious basis for the claim, the court
relied in part on the analysis in Yoder, that "the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in
which society as a whole has an important interest." Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972)). Therefore, the court emphasized the importance of determining whether the claimant was "the sole adherent to his asserted religious belief
and practice." Id.
Though the United States Supreme Court has not defined religion under the First
Amendment, a number of scholars have attempted to offer potential working definitions. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the FirstAmendment, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REV. 579 (1982); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional
Law, 72 CAL. L. REv. 753 (1984); Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work:
A PrincipledApproach to Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
719, 748-49 n.138-41 (1996) (citing these and other attempts to develop a definition of
religion, as well as critiques of such efforts).
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the vast majority of his co-religionists.54 While the dominant view
of the religion may not be dispositive, the Court could have required at least some expert testimony that Thomas's views were a
viable way of interpreting his own professed religious system.
For reasons of both policy and constitutional principle, then, it
may have been preferable for the Court in Thomas to require that
Thomas at least demonstrate that his interpretation represented
more than merely his individual view of his religion. On a policy
level, according constitutional protection to all personal religious
interpretations would seem to endanger the "very concept of ordered liberty" that the Court in Yoder insisted must be
maintained.56
54. Indeed, under the specific circumstances surrounding Thomas's resignation, it
seems that there was a strong basis for the Court to have required a showing that
Thomas's claim was supported by a viable interpretation of his religion. In considering whether his work was permissible for a Jehovah's Witness, Thomas initially approached one of his co-religionists, who responded that he did not feel that their
religion prohibited them from the work. Thomas then approached other members of
the congregation, who agreed to decide whether he would violate his religion by continuing his work. See Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 391 N.E.2d
1127, 1128-29 (Ind. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). As the record did not reflect
whether they made this decision, it is possible that Thomas ultimately decided the
matter himself, despite his earlier reliance on the determination of others. See id. at
236. It is not clear, then, that even Thomas himself would have considered his interpretation to be a viable interpretation of his own professed religion. Moreover, even
if he had, there was reason for the Court either to doubt the sincerity of such a claim
or to reject his interpretation as too variant.
55. In some religions or religious systems, particularly those with a clearly delineated hierarchy of religious tribunals, it may be difficult for those who espouse a minority viewpoint to claim that it represents a "viable interpretation" of a religious
system. In such a situation, one solution may be for adherents to the minority viewpoint to claim that, because their interpretation varies significantly from that of the
hierarchy, the law should consider them to be followers of a different religious system.
If this system represents the view of at least a small number of people, it may be seen
as shared by an organized group.
It is possible, though, that those holding a minority viewpoint may not wish to portray themselves as followers of a different religion. Alternatively, they may be able to
rely on expert testimony of theologians to show that the interpretations of the religious tribunals, even if ultimately authoritative as official doctrine, do not preclude
the viability of minority interpretations.
56. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. Furthermore, it is possible that the Free Exercise
Clause was intended to protect, if not only dominant or mainstream interpretations of
religious systems, at least only viable ones, excluding variant individual views. The
Free Exercise Clause offers powerful protections, which could be reasonably believed
to apply to limited situations. Such a theory is particularly sensible for cases in which
an individual is not forced to violate religious principles, but, as was the case in
Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. 1979), rev'd,
450 U.S. 707 (1981), is only denied a benefit for refusing to violate individually interpreted religious beliefs.
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist identified one such
potential danger, concluding that the Court's approach would apparently allow individuals to "quit their jobs, assert they did so for
personal reasons, and collect unemployment insurance."57 Justice
Rehnquist warned that "[w]e could surely expect the State's limited funds allotted for unemployment insurance to be quickly depleted."58 Again, Justice Rehnquist's analysis is premised on his
somewhat exaggerated view that the majority did not make clear
whether it considered Thomas's claim to be religious in nature.
Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist's warning is important in that it
identifies just one of many dangers to society that can result from
too broad a definition of religious claims entitled to the protections
of the Free Exercise Clause.59
57. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 723 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Another illustration of the problems that could result from the Court's broad
application of free exercise protections is the hypothetical case of a prisoner who
maintains a personal interpretation of religious belief requiring a daily diet consisting
of steak.
Indeed, prisoners' religious claims present particularly difficult problems, as evidenced by some of the debate surrounding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"), which the Supreme Court recently declared unconstitutional. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). The Supreme Court decision of O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), established that prisoners' free exercise claims
should be considered under a reasonableness standard. See id. at 350-51. However,
under RFRA, see infra Part II.G., prisoners were apparently entitled to strict scrutiny
of prison regulations. As a result, one Senator repeatedly proposed an Amendment
to RFRA, to prevent the application of the Act to prisons. In support of the Amendment, he cited such actual claims as: a prisoner who believed that his religion entitled
him to a healthy lifestyle as defined by what food he wanted; a satanic group in prison
that requested unbaptized baby fat for candles; and skinheads in prison who claimed
the right to receive, under their religious beliefs, hateful, bigoted, anti-Semitic and
racist literature from around the country. See 141 CONG. REC. S.10895 (daily ed. July
28, 1995) (statement of Sen. Reid).
While the government would presumably attack the sincerity of a prisoner who
requests, on religious grounds, a daily diet of steak, a court could find that the prisoner expresses sincerely held religious beliefs. Under the Court's analysis in Thomas,
450 U.S. 707, the government would then have to counter the prisoner's claim by
asserting a sufficient governmental or penological interest. Such a showing would
have been particularly difficult under the compelling interest test, apparently required
under RFRA. See, e.g., Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 1996) (striking
down, under RFRA, prison regulations on jewelry, including crucifixes), vacated Sullivan v. Sasnett, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997) (vacating Sasnett v. Sullivan pursuant to City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)).
Alternatively, the government may argue that the wide-ranging First Amendment
protection of religious freedoms, especially those of prisoners, should be limited to
traditional or mainstream religions. Even if a court accepted such an argument, however, the prisoner could still prevail. Under Thomas, it seems, if a prisoner simply
claims that the requirement to eat steak is based on a sincerely held interpretation of
a traditional or mainstream religion, a court would be unable to question the viability
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On a level of constitutional principle, as the Court in Thomas
acknowledged, the Religion Clauses protect only those claims
rooted in religious belief.60 If an individual believes in a way of life
which is shared by no one else, even if the individual asserts that
the belief is religious in nature, such a belief seems closer to what
the Court in Yoder termed a "subjective evaluation and rejection of
the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority."6 1 In-

deed, the Court's emphasis in Yoder on the fact that the Amish
belief was shared by an organized group appears to have been offered in part to counter any arguments that the Amish belief system resembled Thoreau's philosophically-based rejection of the
social values of his time and isolation at Walden Pond.62
of the interpretation, and therefore would have to accept that the claim was based on
the professed religion.
In any event, the application of RFRA to prison claims apparently would have
presented a significant burden on both court and prison administration. See Brief for
Amici States of Ohio et al., City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (No. 952074). The Amici States argued that RFRA "has dramatically increased the volume
of inmate litigation and created unique burdens for prison administrators, States' Attorneys General and other State officials." Id. at *2. The States also cited attempts by
prisoners to rely on RFRA to "cloak [racist] agendas in 'religion,"' and to justify
possession of drugs in prison. Id. at *4 (citing Ocks v. Thalacker, 90 F.3d 293 (8th Cir.
1996)).
In fact, opponents of RFRA claimed that "RFRA has undermined the very goal it
was designed to advance-sensitivity to the religious beliefs of prison inmates." Id. at
*5. For example, these advocates have observed that:
the unprecedented volume of inmate demands under RFRA has under-

mined the ability of religious services personnel to maintain the type of "pastoral" relationships with inmates necessary for the effective delivery of
religious services. Some prison systems, such as the Colorado and
Oklahoma Departments of Corrections, have become so frustrated with the
impact of RFRA that they have discontinued all State-funded chaplaincy
programs.

Id. at *5-6 (citations omitted).
Thus, according to these advocates, the effect of RFRA on the religious rights of
prisoners represented yet another scenario in which an unworkable extension of free
exercise protections has resulted, ironically, in a curtailment of religious liberties.
60. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713.
61. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
62. See id. at 215. In addition, despite Justice Douglas's claim to the contrary, the
majority's sensible distinction in Yoder between a religious belief and a purely philosophical belief does not appear to represent a "retreat" from United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965) and United States v. Welsh, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). See Yoder, 406
U.S. at 247-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
In Seeger and Welsh, the Court made clear that it was interpreting not the word
"religion" found in the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution, but only the term
"religious training and belief" used in a congressional statute exempting conscientious
objectors from military training and service. The Court determined in Seeger that the
rationale behind the exemption for conscientious objectors is that "'in the forum of
conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has always been main-
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Thus, the Court's approach in Thomas, granting Thomas protection based on his unsupported interpretation of his professed religion, is problematic, and may represent a departure from the
approach in Yoder. The Court in Thomas did acknowledge that
"[o]ne can ...imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as to not be entitled to protection under
the Free Exercise Clause," but concluded "that is not the case
here."63 Yet, while Thomas's claim may not have been clearly nonreligious in motivation, it is not clear from the Court's description
and analysis that Thomas's claim warranted the legal protections of
the Free Exercise Clause. Nevertheless, the Court applied the
compelling interest standard to Thomas's claim, holding that the
state violated his First Amendment rights.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Thomas is also important because
it contains an early manifestation of the view that the majority of
the Court ultimately accepted, in Employment Division v. Smith,64
under Chief Justice Rehnquist: "[w]here, as here, a State has enacted a general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does not
in my view require the State to conform the statute to the dictates
of religious conscience of any group. ' 65 Notably, despite his opposition to the majority view, Justice Rehnquist's view would also result in judicial non-interference in questions of religious
interpretation. Justice Rehnquist's approach appears to leave little
room for judicial consideration of the nature of religious claims, as
courts would instead likely decide the constitutionality of a statute
by focusing primarily on the "purpose and effect" of the statute.
Justice Rehnquist disagreed not only with the majority's approach in Thomas, but with the very notion, found in such earlier
tained.' Seeger, 380 U.S. at 170 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605,
633 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)).
Indeed, it is clear from the Court's analysis that the phrase "religious training and
belief" in the statute was interpreted far more broadly than any reasonable interpretation of the word "religion" in the Constitution. For example, the Court in Welsh
stated that the statute exempted those who objected to war based on "moral" or "ethical" grounds, including "those who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to participation in all wars is
founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public policy." Welsh, 398 U.S.
at 342.
63. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
64. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The majority in Smith
distinguished its case from the line of cases that emerged from Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), which generally required a compelling

interest test.
65. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 723 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

19971

RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND BELIEF

cases as Sherbert v. Verner,6 that strict scrutiny should be applied
to a "general statute." Nevertheless, the strength and later influence of Justice Rehnquist's dissent were probably enhanced by his
specific objections to the majority's approach in Thomas, which
employed judicial non-interference to expand free exercise protections. Justice Rehnquist argued in a footnote that "even if I were
to agree that Sherbertwas correctly decided, I would still dissent on
' 67
the grounds that today's decision unjustifiably extends Sherbert.
Perhaps a more moderate majority view in Thomas, carefully analyzing Thomas's religious claim and limiting strict scrutiny to laws
involving a viable and/or substantial free exercise claim, would
have been able to withstand Justice Rehnquist's attacks.68 Instead,
Chief Justice Rehnquist ultimately would succeed in requiring increased deference to legislatures, in Employment Division v. Smith.
Ironically, the Court's approach in Smith would rely in part on the
very principle of judicial non-interference that the majority in
Thomas used to expand free exercise protections.
B.

United States v. Lee

Less than a year after Thomas, in United States v. Lee,6 9 the
Court was faced with another case in which the interpretation of
religious belief was a central issue; again, the Court opted for judicial non-interference. Lee, a member of the Old Order Amish, argued that he should be exempted from social security
requirements, claiming that the payment of social security taxes
and the receipt of benefits interfered with his free exercise rights.7 °
The government challenged Lee's claim, asserting that payment of
social security taxes would not threaten the integrity of the Amish
religious belief or practice. 1 The Court therefore identified the
"preliminary inquiry" in the case as "whether the payment of social
security taxes and the receipt' '72of benefits interferes with the free
exercise rights of the Amish.
Rather than offering a substantive analysis to answer this question, the Court instead quoted from its decision in Thomas, stating
66. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

67. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 723 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. Indeed, it appears that Justice Rehnquist might have preferred such an analysis on the part of the Court, as he criticized the majority for what he saw as a failure to
decide whether Thomas's claim was in fact religious in nature. See id.
69. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
70. See id. at 254-55.
71. See id. at 257.
72. Id. at 256-57.
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that "[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation" and that
it was beyond "the judicial function and judicial competence" to
determine whether Lee or the government had correctly interpreted the Amish faith.73 Employing the same logic it had applied
in Thomas, the Court "therefore accept[ed] appellee's contention
that both payment and receipt of social security benefits is forbidden by the Amish faith. ' 74 Having concluded on this basis that
participation in the social security system interfered with Lee's free
exercise rights, the Court required that the government demonstrate a compelling state interest.75
The Court's analysis raises the same questions as does the analysis in Thomas. Consistent with its approach in Thomas, the Court
offered no evidence to support Lee's claim that the Amish faith
could or should in fact be interpreted to prohibit his participation
in the social security system. Nevertheless, without any investigation into Lee's professed religion, the Court applied the compelling
interest standard, based solely on the presumptive acceptance of
Lee's interpretation.
The Court further relied on Thomas in support of its conclusion
that Lee's claim was entitled to First Amendment protections because it was not "so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation,
as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise
Clause."7 6 However, the premise that Lee's claim was not bizarre
or clearly nonreligious may not lead to the conclusion that his
claim was adequately religious in motivation to warrant the constitutional protections reserved for religious beliefs. Nevertheless, as
in Thomas, the Court did not find it necessary to establish that
Lee's claim was a viable interpretation of the Amish faith, which
was the basis of his professed religious beliefs. Instead, the Court
found it sufficient to merely cite the case of "[a]t least one other
religious organization," Sai Baba, that had sought an exemption to
the social security system. 77 Yet, Lee's claim was based on his interpretation of the faith of his own religious organization, the
Amish; the religious beliefs of a member of the Sai Baba seem
hardly relevant to a question of whether Lee's claim was properly
based in Amish religious belief.
73. See id. at 257 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)).
74. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257.
75. See id.

76. Id. at 257 n.6 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715).
77. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 n.6 (1982).
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Thus, as in Thomas, as a result of the majority's unwillingness to
examine carefully the nature of a religious claim, the Court in Lee
allowed for a broad application of free exercise protections. Ultimately in Lee, the Court found a government interest sufficient to
oppose Lee's claim. 78 Nevertheless, the Court's approach again
reveals the potential danger that judicial non-interference can result in improper protections to individuals at an unnecessary cost
to the rest of society.
Moreover, as illustrated by Justice Stevens's concurring opinion
in Lee, the refusal on the part of judges to analyze religious claims
can potentially result in the opposite danger, of less than sufficient
protection for valid free exercise claims. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens offered his own rationale for what he considered to be the need for courts to refrain from careful analysis of
religious claims. Justice Stevens described the "overriding interest
in keeping the government ... out of the business of evaluating the

relative merits of differing religious claims."' 79 As a result of this
overriding interest, Justice Stevens advocated a "strong presumption" against claims of tax exemption on religious grounds. 80 Thus,
if the majority view provided additional protections to religious
claims, Justice Stevens's view-also based on the principle of judicial non-interference in religious questions-can lead to strong limitations on religious liberties.
In addition, Justice Stevens's approach suggested a new application of judicial non-interference. While the majorities in Thomas
and Lee had stated that courts should not decide religious disputes
among adherents, Justice Stevens extended the range of judicial
non-interference to include treating equally the claims of different
religions, without investigating the specific natures of the different
practices.
Justice Stevens further declared that "[t]he risk that governmental approval of some and disapproval of other [religious claims] will
be perceived as favoring one religion over another is an important
risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude."81 Justice
Stevens thereby added the constitutional dimension of the Establishment Clause to the argument that courts should refrain from

78.
79.
80.
81.

See id. at 259-60.
Id. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See id.
Id. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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deciding religious issues, though he did not adduce any case law to
support such a reading of the Establishment Clause.82
Finally, Justice Stevens's concurrence in Lee was significant because it interpreted the majority opinion in a manner consistent
with the approach later adopted by the majority in Employment
Division v. Smith. 83 Justice Stevens wrote that "[t]he Court's analysis supports a holding that there is virtually no room for a 'constitutionally required exemption' on religious grounds from a valid
tax law that is entirely neutral in its general application. '84 In a
footnote, Justice Stevens further referred to "an almost insurmountable burden on any individual who objects to a valid and
neutral law of general applicability. '8' - Eight years later, in Smith,
Justice Stevens would join in the majority opinion's endorsement
of this view.
C.

Goldman v. Weinberger

Four years after Lee, Justice Stevens applied the same reasoning
in his concurring opinion in Goldman v. Weinberger.87 Goldman,
an Orthodox Jew, challenged Air Force regulations that prohibited
him from wearing a yarmulke while indoors, thus causing him to
violate his religious beliefs. The majority rejected Goldman's
claim, on the basis of deference to military judgment that such a
regulation was necessary to maintain uniformity. 88 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the Court should more
carefully analyze and protect Goldman's free exercise rights. Specifically, Justice Brennan suggested that cases involving different
82. See id. It may be significant that in his concurring opinion in Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1996), in which he again called for judicial non-interference

in religious questions, Justice Stevens quoted from his concurrence in Lee, but omitted the sentence that invoked the Establishment Clause. See id. at 513 n.6 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
83. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

84. Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
86. In the same footnote in Lee, Justice Stevens also began to set the framework
for the Court's rejection of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), as generally requiring a compelling interest standard for
burdens on religious exercise in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Unlike Justice Rehnquist, who had written in his Thomas dissent that Sherbert was
wrongly decided, Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), Justice Stevens distinguished Sherbert and called Yoder an "exception." Lee,
455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
87. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
88. See id. at 509-10.
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religious headgear in the military should be examined individually,
according to the interests of "functional utility, health and safety
considerations, and the goal of a polished, professional
appearance. "89
In addition to agreeing with the majority's logic, Justice Stevens
rejected Justice Brennan's argument on other grounds as well, writing that "[t]he interest in uniformity ... has a dimension that is of
still greater importance for me ... the interest in uniform treatment for the members of all religious faiths." 90 Justice Stevens refused to distinguish between the type of headgear worn by
adherents to different religions, concluding that "[t]he Air Force
has no business drawing distinctions between such persons when it
is enforcing commands of universal application."91 In support of
his view, Justice Stevens cited to his concurring opinion in Lee,
stating that the government should not "'evaluat[e] the relative
merits of differing religious claims.' "92
Thus, as in Lee, Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Goldman
extended the application of the principle that courts should not engage in interpreting religious beliefs. Under Justice Stevens' approach, courts must not only treat equally all claims within a single
religion, but must treat equally all religious claims relating to practices that share some similarity-in this case, religious practices involving headgear. Justice Stevens rejected Justice Brennan's
approach, which offered a framework for the meaningful consideration of different religious practices. Instead, Justice Stevens employed the principle of judicial non-interference to allow for
broader limitations on free exercise rights. 93
Justice Stevens also echoed the logic of his Lee concurrence in
justifying the government restriction on religious practice as being
based on "a neutral, completely objective standard."94 Significantly, in Goldman, Justice Stevens was joined in this approach by
Justices Powell and White 95 who, like Justice Stevens, would again
89. Id. at 519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 512 (Stevens, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 513 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
93. Justice Stevens's relative lack of concern for Free Exercise rights may be evidenced by his citation in Goldman primarily to Establishment Clause cases, even
though Goldman asserted a Free Exercise claim. See id. at 513 n.6 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
94. Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
95. See Weinberger, 475 U.S. at 510.
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defer to "neutral" laws restricting religious practice, in joining the
majority opinion in Smith.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Goldman not only offers a method
for distinguishing between different religious practices; it also reflects a willingness to appreciate the nature of the burden that the
Air Force regulations placed on Goldman's religious practice. Justice Brennan's careful analysis rejected the majority's unconvincing
depiction of Goldman's religious life under the regulations as
merely "objectionable. ' 96 In fact, as Justice Brennan noted,
Goldman was asked "to violate the tenets of his faith virtually
every minute of every workday." 97 Thus, Justice Brennan recognized that Goldman asserted a "substantial First Amendment
claim," which required the government to demonstrate a compelling state interest.98
Justice Brennan's most stinging criticism of the majority is probably his statement that "[t]he Court... evades its responsibility by
eliminating, in all but name only, judicial review of military regulations that interfere with the fundamental constitutional rights of
service personnel." 99 Justice Brennan's criticism was primarily
aimed at the fact that the Court adopted an extremely deferential
standard for military settings. Yet, Justice Brennan appears to
have been similarly troubled by the basic attitude reflected in the
Court's treatment of religious freedoms. Justice Brennan seems to
have recognized that the Court not only expressed unnecessary
deference to military judgment but, at the same time, abdicated its
judicial responsibility of carefully considering Goldman's free exercise rights, choosing instead a uniform rejection of the right to religious headgear, regardless of religious significance or
unobtrusiveness of practice.
D. Bowen v. Roy
Less than three months after Goldman, the emerging differences
between Justices on the Court found fuller expression in the various opinions in Bowen v. Roy."° In Roy, Native Americans challenged, as an unconstitutional burden on their religious beliefs,
regulations that conditioned their receipt of welfare benefits on the
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 516 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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assignment of a Social Security number to their daughter. 10 1 As
announced in Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion, the Supreme
Court vacated a District Court injunction permanently restraining
the use of the Social Security number that had already been issued
to the daughter. 0 2 However, the majority of the Court did not
agree with Chief Justice Burger's own opinion, which advocated
the denial of a religious exemption
to the Social Security number
10 3
requirement of the welfare laws.
In his opinion, in which he was joined only by Justices Powell
and Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger endorsed the view that a statute that is "wholly neutral in religious terms and uniformly applicable" can be distinguished from the statutory scheme challenged in
Sherbert and Thomas, and therefore did not have to withstand
strict scrutiny."° Chief Justice Burger wrote that the compelling
interest standard was "not appropriate in this setting" because, "in
the enforcement of a facially neutral and uniformly applicable requirement for the administration of welfare programs reaching
many millions of people, the Government is entitled to wide latitude."'1 5 Therefore, he concluded, "[a]bsent proof of an intent to
discriminate against particular religious beliefs or against religion
in general, the Government meets its burden when it demonstrates
that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral
and uniform in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting
10 6
a legitimate public interest.'
In Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, she observed that, in contrast to the views
of Chief Justice Burger and those who joined his opinion, "five
Members of the Court agree that Sherbert and Thomas... control
the outcome of this case."'10 7 Rejecting Chief Justice Burger's attempts to distinguish Roy from Sherbert and Thomas, Justice
O'Connor argued that "[t]he Court simply cannot, consistent with
its precedents, distinguish this case from the wide variety of factual
101. See id. at 695.
102. See id. at 695-701.

103. See id. at 701-12 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
104. Id. at 703, 708 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
105. Id. at 707 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).

106. Id. at 707-08 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
107. Id. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition
to herself and Justices Brennan and Marshall, who joined her opinion, Justice
O'Connor counted Justices Blackmun and White. See id. at 716 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part);' id. at 733 (White, J., dissenting).
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situations in which the Free Exercise Clause
indisputably imposes
10 8
significant constraints upon government.
In her sharpest response to Chief Justice Burger's opinion, Justice O'Connor criticized the "new standard to be applied to test the
validity of Government regulations under the Free Exercise
Clause," a standard which "has no basis in precedent and relegates
a serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimal
scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides."' 9
Chief Justice Burger, in turn, countered with an important and
sharply worded footnote, stating that:
[i]t is readily apparent that virtually every action that the government takes, no matter how innocuous it might appear, is potentially susceptible to a Free Exercise objection. For example,
someone might raise a religious objection, based on Norse mythology, to filing a tax return on Wednesday (Woden's day).
Accordingly, if the dissent's interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause is to be taken seriously, then the Government will be
unable to enforce any generally applicable rule unless it can satisfy a federal court that it has a "compelling government interest." While libertarians and anarchists will no doubt applaud
this result, it is hard to imagine that this is what the Framers
intended." °
Of course, Justice O'Connor and the other dissenters were far
from anarchists. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger identified a
danger that can result from the application of the compelling interest standard to all claims that are related to religious beliefs. In his
dissenting opinion in Thomas, Justice Rehnquist expressed his disapproval of Sherbert, but his criticism of the majority opinion focused on what he referred to as the "unjustifiabl[e] exten[sion]" of
Sherbert to claims not religious in nature."' Here, Chief Justice
Burger envisioned a different danger, that the application of strict
scrutiny to government rules affecting any practice purported to be
based in a religious belief would unduly burden governmental
functions.
Like Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Thomas, Justice Burger's criticism of a broad application of the compelling interest test was
strengthened by the fact that those he criticized failed to differentiate between different types of religious claims. Starting with Pres108. Id. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

109. Id. at 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110. Id. at 707 n.17 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
111. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 723 n.1 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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byterian Church and Thomas, the members of the Court and the
Court as a whole had increasingly refused to examine the nature of
religious claims. As a result, under the view that Justice O'Connor
ascribed to the majority of the Court, it appeared that the government would have to show a compelling interest for any law affecting any practice connected in some way with religion. Chief Justice
Burger refused to accept that only a compelling government interest could defeat an individual's opposition to filing tax returns on a
Wednesday based on Norse mythology.
There are a number of ways to approach a potential solution to
Chief Justice Burger's objection. Although she did not address the
objection directly, Justice O'Connor presented an analysis that implicitly answered Chief Justice Burger's predictions of anarchy.
Observing that "[o]ur precedents have long required the Government to show that a compelling state interest is served by its refusal
to grant a religious exemption," Justice O'Connor acknowledged
that "[t]he Government here has clearly and easily met its burden
of showing that the prevention of welfare fraud is a compelling
'
state interest."112
Justice O'Connor concluded, however, that the
Government had failed to show how a religious exemption to the
requirement to obtain a Social Security number would harm the
1 13
compelling interest in preventing welfare fraud.
Under Justice O'Connor's analysis, it does not appear particularly difficult for the government to identify a sufficiently compelling interest for the purposes of justifying a restriction on religious
practice. In Roy, the government "clearly and easily" put forth
such an interest," 4 but Justice O'Connor found that the regulation
was not related to that interest. Her analysis implies, however, that
fears of anarchy were exaggerated, because courts could uphold
restrictions on religion as long as the restrictions were in fact related to a seemingly broad range of compelling government
interests.
Nevertheless, this approach may not completely answer the legitimate concern that Chief Justice Burger raised. Although the precise intention of his reference to Norse mythology is not entirely
clear, Chief Justice Burger apparently wished to focus on the possibility that an individual could object to a law on the basis of an
obscure religious belief. Given the Court's reluctance to investi112. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 732 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

113. See id.
114. Id.
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gate the nature of religious claims, courts would have no effective
means to evaluate the validity of the potential plethora of objections to laws on religious grounds. Instead, in all cases, courts
would require the government to assert a compelling interest for
the law. Even if Justice O'Connor's analysis would allow for a
broad range of compelling interests, it seems likely that at least a
significant number of claims would succeed because courts would
find, as Justice O'Connor did in Roy, that the law did not relate to
the compelling interest.
A more satisfying answer to Chief Justice Burger's objection,
then, might indeed be based on a willingness to closely examine the
nature of the asserted religious claim. One approach could relate
Chief Justice Burger's objection in Roy to the concern he had expressed in his majority opinion in Yoder, that "the very concept of
ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own
standards on matters of conduct on which society as a whole has
n5

important interests.""

In both cases, based on a concern for societal order, Chief Justice
Burger called for limits on the types of Claims that warrant the
stringent protections of the Free Exercise Clause. In Yoder, his solution involved restricting free exercise claims to those rooted in
religion; he found the Amish lifestyle religious in nature, under the
Religion Clauses, in part because it was "shared by an organized
group, and intimately related to daily living.

11

6

Perhaps a similar

analysis would find that a religious claim based in Norse mythology, presumably not based on a religious system with the characteristics of the Amish way of life, would not qualify for free
exercise protections. Such an analysis would thus prevent the anarchy which Chief Justice Burger feared.
This solution, however, would likewise not seem to satisfy Chief
Justice Burger, in part because it apparently contradicts the logic of
his majority opinion in Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment
Sec. Div..1 The Court in Thomas held that Thomas's religious
claim deserved free exercise protection, even though the Court did
not determine whether his claim represented the view of an organized group, the Jehovah's Witnesses of which he professed to be a
member, or was his own individual interpretation. Based on the
principle of judicial non-interference into religious claims, the
Court did not require a showing that Thomas's view was shared by
115. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
116. Id. at 216.
117. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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a religious group. Similarly, it could follow, even an individual
claiming to adhere religiously to Norse mythology would have to
be granted free exercise protections.
Alternatively, then, a different answer to Chief Justice Burger's
objections to Justice O'Connor's approach might involve a closer
analysis of the nature of the burden that a law places on a religious
practice. Such an analysis might consider the importance of the
practice to the professed religious system, restricting a compelling
interest test to those laws which prevent religious practices in a way
that substantially inhibits adherents' religious behavior. Such an
approach, however, was expressly rejected by Justice O'Connor
herself, writing for the Court less than two years later in Lyng v.
118
Northwest Indian Cemetery.
E. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Lyng sharply illustrates the danger to religious freedoms that can
result from courts' unwillingness to consider carefully the nature of
the religious burden posed by government action. In Lyng, the
government permitted the timber harvesting in, and construction
of a road through, a portion of a National Forest that traditionally
had been used for religious purposes by members of three Native
American tribes in northwestern California. 119 The Native American respondents argued that the government's proposed action
would severely burden their religious exercise, and that therefore
the Court should employ a compelling interest test. 120 The Court
cited its decision in Bowen v. Roy,' 2 ' which rejected a similar free
exercise claim. The Native American respondents had suggested a
number of distinctions between Roy and their own case, explaining
the severity of the burden that the government's proposal would
place on .Native American religious practices. 22 The Court rejected the possibility of any such analysis, stating that:
[t]his Court cannot determine the truth of the underlying beliefs
that led to the religious objections here or in Roy, and accordingly cannot weigh the adverse effects on the appellees in Roy
and compare them with the adverse effects on respondents.
Without the ability to make such comparisons, we cannot say
that the one form of incidental interference with an individual's
118. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
119. See id. at 441-42.
120. See id. at 447.

121. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
122. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.
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spiritual activities should be subjected to a different constitutional analysis than the other.'" 3
Based on this logic, the Court ruled out comparing the nature of
the effect that different restrictions could have on different religious practices. 24
The Court's logic is less than convincing. The Court's analysis
was premised on the uncontroversial principle that it could not determine the truth of the religious beliefs underlying the claims in
Roy and in Lyng. This statement simply repeated the well-established principle that courts may not decide the truth or falsity of a
sincerely held religious belief.125 It does not necessarily follow,
however, as the Court concluded, that courts may not look at the
effect of government action on sincerely held religious beliefs.' 26
On the contrary, it would seem sensible that, in considering a free
exercise claim, courts should try to determine the nature of the
burden on the free exercise of religion.
The majority opinion is also troubling because, through its analysis in Lyng, the Court appeared to again introduce a new limitation
on a court's ability to consider carefully religious claims.1 27 It is
perhaps telling that the Court did not cite any cases to support the
notion that courts should not look to the precise nature of the burdens that laws place on religious practices. Instead, it was Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun and Marshall in dissent, who
cited precedent. Justice Brennan argued that courts should "require some showing of 'centrality"' on the part of religious adherents in order to trigger the government's obligation to put forth a
compelling interest. 128 To support his argument, Justice Brennan
cited Yoder, in which the Court "treated the objection to the compulsory school attendance of adolescents as 'central' to the Amish
faith.' 1 29 Likewise, Justice Brennan concluded, in order to apply
strict scrutiny to the law in Lyng, the Court had to find, as in Yoder,
123. Id. at 449-50 (citation omitted).

124. While the Court's holding relied in part on the view that the government's
action did not coerce the respondents into acting contrary to their religious beliefs,
the holding also emphasized the Court's rejection of the respondents' contention that
the Court should inquire into the nature of the potential burden on the Indians' religious practices. See id. at 450-51.
125. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
126. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).

127. See id.
128. Id. at 474 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
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that the government regulation "poses a substantial and realistic
130
threat to undermining or frustrating their religious practices.'
An important aspect of Justice Brennan's dissent was the identification and demonstration of the dual-nature of the dangers that
can result from the majority's approach of grouping together religious claims. The most obvious problem in the majority approach
was apparent in its direct result, that it failed to protect the Native
Americans' substantial religious claims. As Justice Brennan poignantly put it, "[i]ronically, the Court's apparent solicitude for the
integrity of religious belief and its desire to forestall the possibility
that courts might second-guess the claims of religious adherents
leads to far greater inequities than those the Court postulates...
sacrific[ing] a religion at least as old as the Nation itself' to build a
courts found had only the most marginal and
road that "two lower
131
speculative utility.'
Yet, Justice Brennan was also wary of the other problem that can
result from treating all religious claims with the same level of deference, the possibility that a relatively substantial government interest will not be protected against a less than substantial religious
interest. Addressing this concern, Justice Brennan wrote that "I
don't think it is enough to allege simply that the land in question is
held sacred. Rather, adherents challenging a proposed use of federal land should be required to show that the decision places a substantial and realistic threat of frustrating their religious practices."
According to Justice Brennan, only once the adherents have made
such a showing is the government required to respond with a showing of a sufficiently compelling government interest. 132 Thus, as
Justice Brennan's analysis demonstrates, if courts continue to refuse to engage in a careful analysis of religious claims, they face
two potential dangers. At times, as in Lyng, courts may elect not to
apply the compelling interest standard for substantial religious
claims. In other cases, courts may apply a compelling interest test
for less than substantial religious claims; Lee was arguably such a
case.
Despite the careful nature of his analysis, Justice Brennan's approach in Lyng raises further questions, in part because even Justice Brennan was reluctant to evaluate fully the nature of religious
claims. The majority criticized Justice Brennan's call for a showing
130. IM. at 475 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 476-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 475 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of the "centrality" of a religious practice, arguing that such a
requirement:
offers us the prospect of this Court's holding that some sincerely
held religious beliefs and practices are not 'central' to certain
religions, despite protestations to the contrary from the religious
objectors who brought the lawsuit. In other words, the dissent's
approach would require us to rule that some religious adherents
misunderstand their own religious beliefs. We think such an approach cannot be squared with the Constitution or with our
precedents, and that it would 1cast
the Judiciary in a role that we
33
were never intended to play.
Although the majority did not identify the precedents or constitutional principles that would prevent a court from ruling on whether
religious adherents misunderstood their own religious beliefs, the
majority's argument was consistent with the principles found in
such cases as Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment Sec. Div.13 4
35
and United States v. Lee.'
The majority's argument was particularly effective because the
principles of judicial non-interference established in these cases
had been accepted by virtually the entire Court, including Justice
Brennan. As a result of his own unwillingness to analyze religious
beliefs, Justice Brennan's response to the majority's criticism proposed neither a method nor a justification for courts to explore the
centrality of a religious practice. Instead, Justice Brennan reasoned that "Native Americans would be the arbiters of which practices are central to their faith.' 1 36 Predictably, such a response did
not satisfy the majority, which characterized Justice Brennan's definition of a "showing of 'centrality"' as merely "an assertion of centrality.' 37 Here, the Court hinted to the concern for order that
Chief Justice Burger had raised in Roy. Under the majority's understanding of Justice Brennan's approach, courts would be required, based on the mere assertions of professed religious
adherents, to apply broadly the compelling interest standard. Indeed, Justice Brennan did not explain how a court could deny any
assertion of the centrality of a religious practice. It is unclear how,
without such authority, a court would be able to place workable
133. Id. at 457-58.
134. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
135. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
136. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439, 475 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
137. Id. at 457.
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limitations on the range of claims that would require the government to offer a compelling interest for its laws.
Thus, as a result of the apparently universal adoption of judicial
non-interference in religious interpretation, the members of the
Court were forced to select the lesser of two dangers. They had to
choose either to burden the government and society by applying
the compelling interesttest whenever adherents asserted the centrality of a practice, or to restrict religious liberties by refusing to
consider carefully the particular burden that different laws placed
on different practices. As he had in the past, Justice Brennan,
along with the dissenters, opted for protection of religious liberties,
while the majority of the Court reflected the increasing trend toward protecting government and societal interests.
F. Employment Division v. Smith
In 1990, almost two years to the day after Lyng, the majority of
the Court finally adopted a fully developed version of the approach
that had been suggested by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and White
in earlier cases. In Employment Division v. Smith, 38 the newlyappointed Justices Kennedy and Scalia completed the five Justice
majority which rejected the application of the compelling interest
test for a "valid and neutral law of general applicability.' 1 39 The
majority reasoned that "the sounder approach, and the approach in
accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the
[compelling interest] test inapplicable to"' 40 challenges to "an
across-the board criminal prohibition to a particular form of conduct."'' Therefore, the Court held that, notwithstanding respondents' religious beliefs, Oregon could deny respondents
unemployment compensation when their dismissal resulted from a
violation of the general prohibition against the ingestion of peyote.
The majority opinion is disturbing on a number of grounds.
In terms of faithfulness to precedent, the majority stated that the
Court's decisions "have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
138. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
139. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
140. Id. at 885.
141. Id. at 884.
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prescribes (or proscribes)."" 42 Yet, in reality, the majority of the
Court had never accepted the notion that a "neutral law of general
applicability" that burdened religious practice did not have to withstand strict scrutiny.
It is telling that the primary case on which the majority in Smith
relied was United States v. Lee.143 The citation to Lee was, in fact,
to Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in that case, not to the majority opinion. As late as 1986-four years after Lee-in Bowen v.
Roy,14 4 Justice O'Connor had observed that a majority of the Court
still endorsed the compelling interest standard, without permitting
an exception for neutral laws. Likewise, in her concurring opinion
in Smith, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's reliance on Justice Stevens's opinion in Lee to reject the compelling interest standard. Instead, citing a number of Court decisions including the
majority opinion in Lee, Justice O'Connor wrote:
Once it has been shown that a government regulation or criminal prohibition burdens the free exercise of religion, we have
consistently asked the government to demonstrate that unbending application of its regulation to the religious objector "is essential to accomplish an overriding government interest" or
represents "the least restrictive
means of achieving some com45
pelling state interest."'
In addition to arguing that the majority approach was inconsistent with the Court's earlier decisions, Justice O'Connor found that
the majority abdicated the Court's judicial responsibility to consider carefully each case coming before it. Thus, she concluded:
[T]he sounder approach-the approach more consistent with
our role as judges to decide each case on its individual meritsis to apply th[e compelling interest] test in each case to determine whether the burden on the specific plaintiffs before us is
constitutionally significant and whether the particular criminal
interest asserted by the State before us is compelling.' 46
Although they disagreed about the proper standard to apply to
neutral laws that burden religious practices, both the majority and
Justice O'Connor were of the view that courts should not judge the
142. Id. at 879 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
143. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
144. 476 U.S. 693, 732 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 404 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).
146. Id. at 899 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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centrality of specific religious beliefs and practices to religious adherents. Thus, the majority repeated its rejection of Justice Brennan's suggestion in Lyng that the compelling interest test be limited
to when the conduct prohibited by the law is central to the adherent's religious beliefs. 14 7 As in Lyng, the Court expressed dissatisfaction with the possibility that a court would "contradict a
believer's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal
faith."1

48

In addition, the majority elaborated on its criticism of Justice
Brennan's approach, identifying the precedents that it had referred
to but not cited in Lyng. 149 However, a close look at some of the
cases cited suggests that the Court's unwillingness to judge the centrality of religious practices was not supported directly by earlier
decisions, but instead represents the adoption on the part of the
Court of yet another extension of the hands-off approach to deciding issues involving religious interpretation.
For example, the Court relied on Justice Stevens's concurring
opinion in Lee, which had argued that courts should treat equally
the religious claims of different religions, without investigating the
specific natures of the different claims. Based on this principle, the
majority in Smith refused to consider the centrality of religious
practices, asserting that "[j]udging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable 'business of evaluating
the relative merits of differing religious claims.'"150

Thus, the

Court cited to a concurring opinion, which itself presented a novel
approach to judicial non-interference in religion cases, an approach
which had still not been adopted by the majority of the Court; by
analogy, the Court then extended even further the measure of noninterference.
The Smith majority's adoption of Justice Stevens's concurrence
in Lee also serves as a further demonstration of some of the problematic effects that have resulted from the Court's unwillingness to
consider the nature of individual religious claims. In Lee, the majority of the Court relied on Thomas15 1 to extend the range of free
exercise rights, refusing to decide whether Lee had correctly interpreted his religion and therefore presuming that Lee's claim represented a valid interpretation of Amish belief. Justice Stevens'
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See id. at 886-87.
Id. at 887.
See id. at 886.
Id. at 887 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
450 U.S. 707 (1981).

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XXV

concurrence in both Lee and Goldman,152 however, relied on the
reasoning in Thomas to narrow the range of free exercise rights.
Justice Stevens' reasoning enabled courts to avoid judging the validity of religious interpretations, based on a strong presumption
against religious exemptions. As Justice Brennan had anticipated
in his dissent in Lyng, by adopting Justice Stevens' view, the majority in Smith accepted the resulting broad restrictions on free exer153
cise rights.
The majority in Smith further elaborated on its rejection of Justice Brennan's approach in Lyng,' 54 stating that, "[r]epeatedly'and
in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not
presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion
or the plausibility of a religious claim.' 55 However, the context of
these warnings is important. In fact, it appears that the cases that
the Smith majority cited are of questionable value in supporting
the Court's conclusion that courts should not consider the centrality of religious practices. For example, the majority cited such
cases as Thomas v.Review Bd. Ind. Employment Sec. Div. ,156 which
involved an intrafaith dispute over religious interpretation, and
Presbyterian Church,5 7 which merely held invalid either a court's
152. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
153. It is interesting that two years after Smith, in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992), Justice Souter justified the government's freeing the Native American Church
from federal laws prohibiting peyote use as "simply respect[ing] the centrality of peyote to the lives of certain Americans." Id. at 629 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice
Souter's acceptance of the government's ability to determine the centrality of the use
of peyote in the Native American Church may suggest that he would not resist the
Court's making similar determinations.
It is notable that in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993), Justice Souter criticized the Smith majority and agreed with the Justices in Smith who endorsed the application of a compelling state interest test when a
law substantially burdened religious conduct. See id. at 562-63 (Souter, J.,
concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). Similarly, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.
Ct. 2157 (1997), Justice Souter expressed "serious doubts about the precedential value
of the Smith rule and its entitlement to adherence," and called for "reargument permitting plenary reexamination of this issue." Id. at 2186. (Souter, J., dissenting).
In addition, it is significant that Justice Breyer joined in Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, which stated that "in light of both our precedent and our Nation's tradition of religious liberty, Smith is demonstrably wrong," and that "we should
reexamine our holding in Smith, and.., return to a rule that requires government to
justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state
interest and to impose that burden only by means narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest." Id. at 2177-78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
154. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439, 474-75 (1988).
155. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990).
156. See id. (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)).
157. See id. (citing Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)).
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rejection of a church tribunal's religious interpretation or-according to Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Milivojevich-a state-created
law involving interpretation of church doctrine. These cases do not
stand for the proposition that courts may not consider the centrality of a religious practice.
Perhaps the most questionable as well as revealing citation was
to United States v. Ballard.'5 8 In Ballard, the Court established the
important principle that it was unable to determine the truth or
falsity of religious beliefs.' 59 In citing Ballard, the majority in
Smith echoed the Court's logic from Lyng, equating the inability to
judge the plausibility of a sincerely held religious belief with the
asserted inability of courts to consider the place of a certain practice within a religious system.' 60 Thus, the majority's conclusion
actually extended the principles established in the cases on which it
was premised.
Justice O'Connor, who had written the majority opinion in Lyng
criticizing Justice Brennan's approach, agreed with the majority in
Smith that courts should not judge the centrality f a religious practice. 161 Yet, she also maintained that the Court should continue to
apply the compelling interest test to laws that burdened religious
practice.' 62 The combination of these positions left Justice
O'Connor vulnerable to criticism. Indeed, again in a footnote, 63
the majority engaged in a criticism similar to but more expansive
Burger had levelled against Justice
than that which Chief Justice
164
O'Connor in Bowen v. Roy.
Analyzing the combined logic of Justice O'Connor's two positions, the majority concluded that "[t]his means, presumably, that
compelling-interest scrutiny must be applied to generally applicable laws that regulate or prohibit any religiously motivated activity,
no matter how unimportant to the claimant's religion.' 1 65 The majority found such a result untenable, arguing convincingly that:
dispensing with a "centrality" inquiry is utterly unworkable. It
would require, for example, the same degree of "compelling
state interest" to impede the practice of throwing rice at church
weddings as to impede the practice of getting married in church.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

322 U.S. 78 (1944).
See id.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
See id. at 906-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
See id.
Id. at 885 n.2.
476 U.S. 693 (1986); see supra Part II.D.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 n.4 (emphasis in original).
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There is no way out of the difficulty that, if general laws are to
be subjected to a "religious practice" exception, both the importance of the law at issue and the centrality of the practice at
issue must reasonably be considered.166
The majority's criticism of Justice O'Connor's opinion and its acceptance of the alternative approach to general laws that burden
religious practice represent perhaps the ultimate illustration of the
problems in free exercise jurisprudence that result from judicial
non-interference in religious questions. The majority accurately
observed that under Justice O'Connor's views, the government
would apparently be required to show a compelling interest for a
law that burdens any religious practice, regardless of the relative
significance of the practice within a religious system. 67 Thus, similar to Chief Justice Burger's observation in Bowen v. Roy, 168 it appears that Justice O'Connor's adherence to judicial noninterference in issues of religious interpretation, coupled with her
adherence to the compelling interest test, yields too broad a range
of claims against which government actions must withstand strict
69
scrutiny.
One answer to the majority's criticism may lie in another statement in Justice O'Connor's opinion, which calls for determining
"whether the burden on the specific plaintiffs before us is constitutionally significant."' 7 ° As Justice O'Connor does not define or
elaborate in any way on the notion of a "constitutionally significant" burden, its meaning is not entirely clear. In fact, the majority
suggested that this standard contradicts Justice O'Connor's rejection of centrality. 171 In any event, requiring that a religious burden
166. Id. (emphasis in original).
167. See id. at 889 n.5.

168. 476 U.S. at 707 n.17.
169. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990).

170. Id. at 899 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
171. See id. at 887-88 n.4. The majority put forth a similar argument to reject the

position advanced by Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion in which he was joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Like the other members of the Court, Justice
Blackmun agreed that courts should not consider the centrality of religious practices,
but he insisted that courts should not ignore "the severe impact of a State's restrictions on the adherents of a minority religion." Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
To support this approach, Justice Blackmun cited to the Court's analysis in Wisconsin
v. Yoder, which found that, because "'education is inseparable from and a part of the
basic tenets of their religion ...[,
just as] baptism, the confessional, or a sabbath may
be for others,"' enforcement of the compulsory education law would "'gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs."' Id. (quoting

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972)). Justice Blackmun applied a similar
analysis to the claim of the religious adherents in Smith, detailing and documenting
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be constitutionally significant may place workable limitations on
religious claims that can be refuted only by a compelling state
interest.
Alternatively, as in Roy, Justice O'Connor may have implicitly
responded to the majority's criticism by showing that, in practice,
applying the compelling interest test to a broad range of religious
claims need not be unworkable because the government may often
be able to satisfy the test. In Smith, Justice O'Connor found that
the government has a compelling interest in regulating peyote use,
and that granting a religious exemption "will unduly interfere with
172
fulfillment of the governmental interest.

Nevertheless, the majority rejected Justice O'Connor's analysis,
again echoing Chief Justice Burger's criticism in Roy:
If the "compelling interest" test is to be applied at all.., it must
be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded. Moreover, if "compelling interest" really
means what it says ... many laws will not meet the test. Any

society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but
that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them . . . [W]e cannot afford the luxury of
deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objec-

tor, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest
of the highest order. The rule respondents favor would open the
prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from
civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.' 73
Finally, the majority added that it did not:
suggest that courts would necessarily permit harmful exemptions from these laws (though they might), but ...

that courts

would constantly be in the business of determining whether...
the "constitutiona[l] significan[ce]" of the "burden on the specific plaintiffs" . . . suffices to permit us to confer an exemption
....[1It is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regu-

larly balance against the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice.174
the Native American belief that "the peyote plant embodies their deity, and eating it

is an act of worship and communion... the essential ritual of their religion." Id. at
919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

172. Id. at 905 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
173. Id. at 888 (emphasis in original).
174. Id. at 889 n.5.
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The majority acknowledged that its approach would disadvantage
minority religions, but stated that this result was preferable to "a
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality
175
of all religious beliefs.
Thus, the debate in Smith is both striking and illuminating because both the majority and Justice O'Connor employed the same
principle of refusing to consider the centrality of a religious practice. While Justice O'Connor used this principle to expand the protections afforded free exercise claims, the majority relied on Justice
O'Connor's adoption of the principle to demonstrate the problems
that could result from her views. The majority thereby ultimately
succeeded in relying on the principle of judicial non-interference in
religious questions to produce a more narrow interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause.
G.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act

In reaction to Smith, in 1993 Congress enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. The Act stated that "[g]overnment shall
not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability" unless the government "demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest test.117 6 The declared purpose of the Act was to "restore the
compelling interest test-as set forth in" Sherbert and Yoder "and to
guarantee its application to all cases where free exercise of religion
'
is substantially burdened."177
The Act appeared to be an encouraging step towards requiring courts to engage in a more careful
analysis of free exercise claims, in order to decide whether a substantial burden exists.
Nevertheless, scholars and courts alike raised many questions regarding the interpretation, constitutionality and proper application
of the Act.1 78 Among other important issues, application of the
175. Id. at 890.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a), (b).

177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
178. See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties With the First Amendment: Congress,
Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48

VAND.

L. REV. 1539 (1995);

Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L.

REV.

437 (1994); Kent Greenawalt, Quo

Vadis: The Status and Prospectsof "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 Sup.

CT.

REv. 323, 333-59; Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of
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Act's reference to a "substantial[ ] burden" on religious exercise
appeared to require courts to engage in the kind of investigation
into religious beliefs that Supreme Court Justices have increasingly
and nearly uniformly rejected. In any event, the Supreme Court
did not have to address these questions, as it declared the Act an
1 79
unconstitutional extension of Congress' power.
I. Establishment Clause Cases
In Establishment Clause cases, courts are sometimes required to
consider the religious significance of a practice. Unlike in Free Exercise Clause cases, though, the issue in Establishment Clause cases
usually does not concern the centrality or the importance of a practice within a religious system. Instead, courts are often confronted
with the question of whether a particular practice is in fact religious
and/or sectarian in nature, and therefore must not be improperly
"established" by the government. Nevertheless, although the focus
of courts' analysis will differ in the two types of cases, the dangers
that may result from an unwillingness to examine carefully practices in Establishment Clause cases parallel the dangers of such an
approach in Free Exercise Clause cases.
If a court does not examine the religious nature of specific practices when called upon to determine the acceptable form and extent of government involvement in those practices, one of two
troubling results may arise. One possibility is that, unwilling or unable to make actual findings, the court will decide generally to minimize the religious qualities of different practices. In so doing, the
court might allow the government improperly to participate in or
endorse, and thus help establish, what is truly a religious practice.
The alternate danger is that a court may group together practices
as being largely religious in nature, regardless of the actual secular
or nonsectarian value of a particular practice. In this scenario, a
court could preclude the government from engaging in permissible
accommodation of what may often be positive and productive societal activities.
In contrast to the parallel dangers arising in Free Exercise
Clause cases, the potential dangers that may result from judicial
non-interference in evaluating religious practices in Establishment
Clause cases are not always manifested in as direct a manner in the
the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65 (1996); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S.
Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REv. 209
(1994).
179. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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opinions of Supreme Court Justices. Moreover, unlike the cases
that led up to and resulted in Employment Division v. Smith, 8 ' the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has not developed gradually towards a landmark decision, representing a new
and arguably problematic approach on the part of the Court as a
whole. Nevertheless, a close look at some of the opinions in Establishment Clause cases suggests that the dangers indeed find expression in the Court's consideration of Establishment Clause
questions as well.
A. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union
An illustration of the potential problems that may result from
courts' non-interference in analyzing the religious nature of certain
practices can be found in Justice Kennedy's opinion in County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union. 8 ' Notably, Justice
Kennedy was joined in this opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Scalia, three Justices who, in free exercise cases,
also endorsed the view that courts should play a limited role in
determining issues that involve questions relating to interpreting
religious belief and practice.' 82
In Allegheny, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
government's permitting the display of a creche in the county
courthouse, and the display of a menorah in the City-County
Building.'83 In his majority opinion addressing the display of the
creche, in which he was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Brennan and Marshall, Justice Blackmun observed that the creche
"use[d] words, as well as the picture of the Nativity scene, to make
its religious meaning unmistakably clear."' 84 Justice Blackmun interpreted the phrase appearing on the creche-"Glory to God in
the Highest"-as meaning "Glory to God because of the birth of
'
Justice Blackmun concluded that "ItIhis praise to God in
Jesus."185
Christian terms is indisputably religious-indeed sectarian-just as
it is when said in the Gospel or in a church service."'1 8 6 Based on
this reasoning, the majority held that the display of the creche violated the Establishment Clause because, through it, Allegheny
County celebrated Christmas "in a way that has the effect of en180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See supra Parts I, I.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
See supra Parts II.B-C, F.
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 579.
Id. at 598.
Id.

186. Id.
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dorsing a patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of
1 87
Jesus."'
The Court's decision regarding the display of the menorah was
more complex. Although the majority of the Court held that the
display of the menorah did not violate the Establishment Clause,
there was no Opinion of the Court in this regard. Instead, Justice
Blackmun wrote an opinion expressing his rationale for why the
display of the menorah was constitutionally valid, while Justice
Kennedy and those joining in his opinion presented a different
analysis for upholding the display of the menorah. A look at the
different approaches among the Justices in considering the religious nature of the menorah helps illustrate some of the problems
that may result when questions of religious practice arise in Establishment Clause cases.
Justice Blackmun based his reasoning on the premise that,
although the menorah "is a religious symbol . . .the menorah's
message is not exclusively religious. ' 188 To support this premise,
Justice Blackmun engaged in an extensive analysis of the religious
and cultural aspects of the menorah. 189 After describing the religious symbolism and use of the menorah in connection with the
holiday of Chanukah, Justice Blackmun added that "Chanukah,
like Christmas, is a cultural event as well as a religious holiday."' 190
Justice Blackmun elaborated on the comparison between Christmas and Chanukah, observing that "[j]ust as some Americans celebrate Christmas without regard to its religious significance, some
nonreligious American Jews celebrate Chanukah as an expression
of ethnic identity."'191 Moreover, Justice Blackmun noted the "socially heightened status of Chanukah," which, he suggested, "reflects its cultural or secular dimension.' 1 92 Thus, comparing the
legal status of Christmas to that of Chanukah, Justice Blackmun
reasoned that "[b]ecause government may celebrate Christmas as a
secular holiday," such as by allowing the display of a Christmas
tree in a public place, "it follows that government may also acknowledge Chanukah as a secular holiday," by allowing the display
of a menorah. 193 In short, Justice Blackmun concluded that in the
context in which it stood, "the display of the menorah [was] not an
187. Id. at 601.
188. Id. at 613 (Opinion of Blackmun, J.).
189. See id. at 582-87 (Opinion of Blackmun, J.).

190. Id. at 585.
191. Id.

192. Id. at 587.
193. Id. at 615.
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endorsement of religious faith, but simply a recognition of cultural
'
diversity."194
Justice Kennedy contended that neither the creche nor the menorah violated the Constitution. Although he concurred with Justice Blackmun's ruling upholding the display of the menorah,
Justice Kennedy strongly disagreed with Justice Blackmun's approach, on several grounds. In his final argument, Justice Kennedy
criticized Justice Blackmun for "assum[ing] the difficult and inap1' 95
propriate task of saying what every religious symbol means.'
After noting the complexity of the menorah's religious significance,
Justice Kennedy further asserted that "[t]his Court is ill equipped
to sit as a national theology board, and I question
both the wisdom
1' 96
and the constitutionality of its so doing.'

Therefore, instead of relying on an analysis of the religious and
cultural aspects of the menorah, Justice Kennedy offered a different approach for upholding the display of not only the menorah,
but of the creche as well. Justice Kennedy's approach recognized a
"tradition of government accommodation and acknowledgment of
religion that has marked our history from the beginning."' 97 Justice Kennedy found "well within" this tradition the government's
interest in allowing the display of the creche and the menorah, "to
acknowledge . . .the historical background and the religious...

nature of the Chanukah and Christmas holidays."' 98
Through this approach, Justice Kennedy did apparently avoid
the need to analyze the precise nature of the religious meaning behind the creche and the menorah. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's
approach raises a number of questions. In fact, the potential
problems that can result from Justice Kennedy's approach may be
more disturbing than those he identified in his exaggerated depiction of Justice Blackmun's requiring the Court to sit as a "national
theology board."
One question raised by Justice Kennedy's approach involves the
issue of how courts can be expected to decide cases relating to religious practices if courts do not analyze carefully the religious nature of those practices. As Justice Blackmun noted in his response
to Justice Kennedy's criticism, "[a]ny inquiry concerning the government's use of a religious object to determine whether that use
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 619.
Id. at 678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 663.
Id.
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results in an unconstitutional religious question requires a review
of the factual record concerning the religious object-even if the
inquiry is conducted pursuant to Justice Kennedy's . . . test."' 199
Justice Blackmun further reasoned that "[s]urely, Justice Kennedy
cannot mean that this Court must keep itself in ignorance of the
symbol's conventional use and decide the constitutional
question
' 2 00
knowing only what it knew before the case was filed.
Thirteen years earlier, in his dissenting opinion in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich,2° ' Justice Rehnquist had employed a similar approach. In Milivojevich, Justice Rehnquist
argued that in order to adjudicate a case involving interpretation of
canon law, courts would inevitably be required to choose one interpretation over another. For this choice to be a rational one, he
further explained, courts would have to consider different reasons
for each interpretation. Finally, Justice Rehnquist praised the Illinois courts for basing their decisions on the information presented
by expert testimony.2 °2 Similarly, Justice Blackmun insisted that,
for courts to adjudicate the .issue of whether the government has
improperly endorsed a symbol, courts first must make a rational
decision regarding the religious nature of the symbol.
In addition, Justice Stevens, who had joined Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Milivojevich, again. expressed similar sentiments in his
opinion in Allegheny, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
Although he disagreed with Justice Blackmun's conclusion regarding the religious nature of the menorah, finding instead that the
menorah was "unquestionably a religious symbol, ' 20 3 Justice Stevens did not share Justice Kennedy's aversion to a careful analysis
of the religious nature of the menorah. Instead, consistent with the
approach he had endorsed in Milivojevich, Justice Stevens based
his conclusion on the expert testimony of a rabbi who -haddisputed
the notion that Chanukah could be viewed as a secular holiday. a 4
Another question raised by Justice Kennedy's approach involves
the potential danger that his deference to government "acknowledge[ment] of these holidays [and] their religious component, 2 a 5
based on "our strong tradition of government accommodation and
199. Id. at 614 n.60 (Opinion of Blackmun, J.).
200. Id.
201. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).

202. See supra Part I.B.
203.
in part
204.
205.

Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 654 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting in part).
See id. at 654 n.15 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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acknowledgement, ' 20 6 may narrow too greatly the range and
strength of the Establishment Clause. According to the logic of
Justice Kennedy's refusal to allow the Court to "say[ ] what every
religious symbol means, ' ' 20 7 it appears that the government would
be allowed to "accommodate" and "acknowledge" even those
practices of an unequivocally religious and sectarian nature.2 °8
It is interesting that, despite his criticism of Justice Blackmun's
careful analysis of the relative religious and secular aspects of the
menorah, Justice Kennedy himself referred a number of times to
the secular aspects of Chanukah and Christmas. Such language
may serve in part to counter the suggestion that Justice Kennedy
would allow the improper government endorsement of a clearly
religious practice. In any event, Justice Kennedy's apparent emphasis and perhaps partial reliance on the secular nature of these
holidays seems to weaken his criticism of Justice Blackmun's
approach.
For example, Justice Kennedy expressed his approval for what
he referred to as the government's acknowledgment of the "religious, as well as secular, nature of the Chanukah and Christmas
holidays. "209 He further described government participation in "its
citizens' celebration of a holiday that contains both a secular and
religious component," insisting that "enforced recognition of only
the secular aspect
would signify.., callous indifference toward reli210
gious faith.
Most significantly, in explaining his reasoning for upholding the
display of both the creche and the menorah, Justice Kennedy actually cited sections of Justice Blackmun's analysis to support the assertion that "[b]oth [the creche and the menorah] are the
traditional symbols of religious holidays that over time have acquired a secular component. '211 Indeed, Justice Kennedy's obser206. Id.

207. Id. at 678.
208. Justice Kennedy did allow for some limitations on government acknowledgment and accommodation of religion, in an "extreme case." Id. at 661. For example,
he agreed that a city would be prohibited from allowing the "obtrusive year-round
religious display" of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall. Id. Yet, Justice Kennedy emphasized that he would object to such a display not because it represents
,.government speech about religion . . . but because such an obtrusive year-round
display would place the government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize
on behalf of a particular religion." Id. Thus, Justice Kennedy apparently would not
object if the government would accommodate a less obtrusive yet unequivocally religious practice or symbol.
209. Id. at 663.
210. Id. at 663-64.
211. Id. at 573.
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vation is merely a condensed and somewhat moderated version of
Justice Blackmun's analysis, which Justice Kennedy212criticized for
turning the Court into a "national theology board.
Moreover, such an analysis is inconsistent with Justice Kennedy's
assertion that courts should avoid determining the meaning of religious symbols.213 If courts may determine that a symbol has taken
on a secular component, it is not clear why courts may not also
determine the extent to which a symbol has acquired that secular
component. If, according to Justice Kennedy, the government is
less likely to violate the Establishment Clause when a religious
symbol has a secular component, it should follow that the government is conversely more likely to violate the Establishment Clause
when the secular component is relatively minor. It would be
proper, then, and apparently necessary, for a court to try to determine, as did Justice Blackmun, the extent of the relative secular
components of both the creche and the menorah.
Despite the contradiction inherent in his own analysis, Justice
Kennedy characterized the majority's view as inconsistent, proclaiming that "were I required to choose between the approach
taken by the majority and a strict separationist view, I would have
to respect the consistency of the latter. ' 2 14 Justice Kennedy
seemed to acknowledge that, while his approach was "consistent"
in result in Allegheny, allowing for the display of both the creche
and the menorah, it did not have the intellectual consistency of a
"strict separationist view."
Justice Kennedy did not adopt this separationist approach, or
even explain what specific views would form the basis for such an
approach. Nevertheless, he seemed to consider the separationist
approach a viable alternative, at least preferable to Justice Blackmun's analysis. Perhaps Justice Kennedy envisioned a type of separationist who would advocate an extreme-and indeed
consistent-form of his own approach, rejecting any attempt to analyze an activity's religious nature. Such a separationist might be
unwilling even to acknowledge what the majority-and Justice
Kennedy-described as the secular component of the menorah dis212. Id. at 678.
213. See id. Indeed, the majority found such an inconsistency in Justice Kennedy's
approach inevitable, arguing that "[a]ny inquiry concerning the government's use of a

religious object to determine whether the use results in an unconstitutional religious
preference requires a review of the factual record concerning the religious objecteven if the inquiry is conducted pursuant to Justice Kennedy's... test." Id. at 614
n.60.
214. Id. at 678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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play. The separationist could therefore be compelled to find unconstitutional the government accommodation of any activity with
a religious component, such as the display of the menorah, regardless of any secular nature of the activity; even the recognition of an
obviously secular component requires a consideration of the meaning of a religious symbol. This approach, an extension of Justice
Kennedy's view though based on similar logic, would indeed result
in a certain measure of consistency, as courts consistently would
strike down government attempts to accommodate religion. One
unfortunate result, though, would be a grouping together of activities, regardless of their relative secular nature, resulting in a decrease in permissible government accommodation of expression, as
illustrated by the example of the menorah.
In fact, this danger is not merely hypothetical, but appears to
have found actual expression in Justice Souter's concurring opinion
in Lee v. Weisman.2 5
B. Lee v. Weisman
The Establishment Clause plays a vital role in prohibiting the
government from favoring or endorsing religion. Despite the importance of the principles underlying the Establishment Clause,
however, courts should not prevent the government from supporting activities that do not involve religious endorsement. A close
look at Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Lee v. Weisman2 16
suggests that the application of his approach might lead to such
unfortunate results.
In Weisman, the Court held that a public high school's allowing
members of the clergy to offer prayers at graduation ceremonies
violated the Establishment Clause. After considering the nature of
high school graduations, the majority framed the issue in the case
as "whether a religious exercise may be conducted at a graduation
ceremony in circumstances where, as we have found, young graduates who object are induced to conform.

' 217

The majority con-

cluded that, through the prayer, the school "compel[led] or
persuade[d] a student to participate in a religious exercise," in violation of the Establishment Clause.218
Though he concurred with the majority's holding, Justice Souter
wrote a separate opinion to respond to the "nonpreferentialist" ar215.
216.
217.
218.

505 U.S. 577 (1992).
Id. at 609 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 599.
Id.
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gument, which he described as distinguishing between "sectarian"
religious practices and those that would be "ecumenical enough to
pass Establishment Clause muster. ' 219 Justice Souter first responded on historical grounds, providing extensive documentation
to support his contention that the Framers rejected the nonpreferentialist position.22 °
Following his historical argument, Justice Souter expressed his
concern that "[s]imply by requiring the inquiry [as to whether a
practice is sectarian or ecumenical], nonpreferentialists invite the
courts to engage in comparative theology."' 221 He therefore rejected the nonpreferentialist approach, because "I can hardly imagine a subject less amenable to the competence of the federal
222
judiciary, or more deliberately to be avoided where possible.
Yet, Justice Souter did not explain why he deemed it beyond the
competence of courts to decide whether a particular practice is sectarian or ecumenical. Instead, he merely noted that the prayer at
issue in Weisman was, in his view, Theistic in nature, failing to account for the beliefs of adherents to non-Theistic religions.223
However, even accepting the conclusion that the particular prayer
in Weisman was not ecumenical in nature need not invalidate the
nonpreferentialist approach that would call for government accommodation of a truly ecumenical prayer, one that is "sufficiently generic" to encompass non-Theistic beliefs as well.224
Moreover, it would seem that in order to consider properly
whether government support of a particular practice violates the
Establishment Clause, courts should not avoid inquiring as to
whether that practice-or prayer-is sectarian or ecumenical. If a
court's competence is to include adjudicating difficult cases that
come before it, a court must examine, in cases such as Weisman,
the sectarian or ecumenical nature of a practice. Courts should not
rely on an aversion to "comparative theology" to avoid difficult
decisions in cases relating to religion, any more than courts would
find it plausible to avoid deciding cases relating to complex scientific questions, on the ground that such analysis is beyond their
competence.
219. Id. at 616 (Souter, J., concurring).

220. See id. at 612-16 (Souter, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 616 (Souter, J., concurring).

222. Id. at 616-17 (Souter, J., concurring).
223. See id. at 617 (Souter, J.,concurring).
224. Id.
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Indeed, in dissenting to the First Circuit's decision in Weisman,
which the Supreme Court affirmed, Judge Campbell expressed
such faith in the ability of the courts. Judge Campbell responded
to the concern, voiced in the District Court decision by Chief Judge
Boyle and later echoed in Justice Souter's opinion, fearing
"church-state entanglement if the courts must determine what
prayers are nonsectarian enough to pass muster. ' 225 Though concededly "troubled" by this concern, Judge Campbell insisted that it
was "reasonably simple to separate sectarian from nonsectarian
utterances. "226
Furthermore, though he concurred in the Court's decision in
Weisman, Justice Blackmun's careful analysis of the prayer at issue
suggests that courts are competent to consider the religious nature
of a practice. Based on the substance of the prayer, Justice Blackmun found "no doubt" that the invocation was "a religious activity. '227 In fact, citing the prayer's quotation to the Book of the
Prophet Micah, Justice Blackmun found that "the religious
message it promotes is specifically Judeo-Christian. ' '228 If it is possible, under this approach, to find a prayer clearly religious, and to
identify the precise nature of its religious message, perhaps it is
likewise possible to find a different prayer, or a different practice,
229
ecumenical-or even secular-in nature.
Of course, Justice Souter's rejection of the prayer in Weisman
was not based solely on his rejection of "comparative theology."
Justice Souter rejected, on historical grounds, the very concept of a
nonpreferentialist approach to the Establishment Clause. The majority similarly rejected as unconstitutional the government support
of a "civic religion ... which is tolerated when sectarian exercises
225. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1098 (1st Cir. 1990) (Campbell, J.,
dissenting),
affid, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
226. Weisman, 908 F.2d at 1098. Judge Campbell was also optimistic that most adherents to any religious or ethical system would "find it is appropriate and meaningful

for public speakers to invoke the deity not as an expression of a particular sectarian
belief but as an expression of transcendent values and of the mystery and idealism so

absent from much of modern culture." Id. at 1098-99.
227. 505 U.S. at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 604 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
229. Indeed, after admonishing the Court not to engage in comparative theology,
Justice Souter himself engaged in a theological analysis of the prayer in Weisman, to
the extent that he found it unacceptable to non-Theistic religious adherents. See id. at
617 (Souter, J.,concurring). If Justice Souter considered courts competent to find
that a religious practice is not sufficiently generic for some believers, it is not clear

why he should rule out courts' ability to similarly determine that a different practice is
permissibly nonsectarian under the Establishment Clause.
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' 230

Moreover, Justice Souter observed that the particular
prayer in Weisman "embodie[d] a straightforwardly Theistic premise, '"231 while Justice Blackmun found the religious
message of the
' 23 2
Judeo-Christian.
"specifically
be
to
prayer
Nevertheless, in other cases, Justice Souter's approach would appear to lead to too broad an application of the Establishment
Clause, preventing the government from engaging in even the
proper support of certain practices. For example, if a practice has a
religious component but also an overriding secular component, it
seems that Justice Souter's approach could prevent a court from
even considering the relative religious and secular nature of the
practice. One possible result would be a presumptive rejection of
government support for any practice that has even the slightest
religious component, despite the potential benefit of the practice to
society.233
An alternative danger could arise if Justice Souter's approach is
applied by a court generally favoring government support for religious activities. Unable to consider the relative religious or secular
components of a particular practice, such a court may adopt a presumptive acceptance of government support for a largely religious
practice merely because the practice has a secular component. The
result could be improper government support of truly religious
practices, in violation of the Establishment Clause.
are not.

Conclusion
In concluding his dissent in Milivojevich, Justice Rehnquist offered a reasonable and balanced view of whether courts should involve themselves in deciding religious questions. He stated that
"while there may be a number of good arguments that civil courts
...should, as a matter of the wisest use of their authority, avoid
adjudicating religious disputes to the maximum extent possible,
they obviously cannot avoid all such adjudications. '234 It appears
that since Milivojevich, the Supreme Court has heeded the first
part of Justice Rehnquist's prescription, that courts should avoid
adjudicating religious disputes-and questions-whenever possi230. Id. at 589.

231. Id. at 617 (Souter, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 604 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
233. A similar danger may result from the approach of the "separationist" appearing in Justice Kennedy's opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 678
(1989). See supra Part III.A.
234. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 735 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ble. In fact, the Supreme Court has gradually extended the degree
of judicial non-interference that it deems appropriate in cases involving religious questions.
Yet, the end of Justice Rehnquist's prescription seems to have
gone largely ignored by the Court. While there are a number of
good arguments to support the wisdom., of courts' avoidance of adjudicating religious disputes, courts cannot-and should notavoid all adjudication of religious questions. Recent cases demonstrate some of the dangers that have arisen and could potentially
increase in both Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause
cases as a result of the Court's hands-off approach to religious
questions.
In Free Exercise Clause cases, by grouping together different
religious practices, courts may grant improper protections to professed adherents, resulting in unnecessary burdens on government
and society, or, conversely, may permit unduly harsh governmental
limitations on religious liberties. Parallel dangers exist in Establishment Clause cases. In refusing to examine carefully the religious character of different practices, courts may prevent proper
accommodation of largely secular expression, or allow impermissible establishment of practices of a substantially religious nature.
On balance, then, it appears that the Supreme Court should reexamine the results of its Religion Clause jurisprudence, and adopt a
willingness to consider more carefully questions of religious practice and belief.

